Strategies for fighting

When I was in graduate school, a professor once told our class: "The problem with anti-corruption efforts isn't that we don't know what works—it's that we keep trying things that don't." He was being provocative, of course, but there was truth in it. For decades, we've approached corruption with a peculiar blend of moral outrage and ineffective technocracy. We create oversight committees, pass transparency laws, and impose harsher penalties—yet corruption persists with remarkable resilience.

This shouldn't surprise us. Corruption isn't just a moral failing—it's a coordination problem. Each participant in a corrupt system is responding to incentives in ways that are locally rational, even as the system itself produces outcomes nobody wants.

Consider the classic example of police bribery. When officers are underpaid, taking bribes becomes an economic necessity. Citizens pay bribes because refusing means delays or worse. Politicians don't raise police salaries because corruption provides plausible deniability for budget shortfalls. The system is stable despite being terrible.

So how do we break these equilibria? Let's examine what actually works.

Traditional anti-corruption strategies typically fall into three categories: transparency initiatives, punishment mechanisms, and moral appeals. Each has severe limitations.

Transparency initiatives assume corruption will wither under public scrutiny. But information alone doesn't change incentives. Romania implemented one of Europe's most comprehensive transparency systems in 2016, yet Transparency International reports minimal improvement in corruption perceptions¹. The public having information isn't sufficient when they lack the power to act meaningfully on it.

Punishment approaches face the "who watches the watchmen" problem. When corruption is systemic, enforcement mechanisms themselves become corrupt. Venezuela's anti-corruption agency became so notoriously corrupt that locals joked it should be renamed "Pro-Corruption."² Enhanced penalties often just raise the price of bribes rather than eliminating them.

Moral appeals—training programs emphasizing ethical conduct—fail because they don't change underlying incentives. A Nigerian civil servant who can't feed his family on his salary won't be persuaded by ethics training to reject bribes that could pay for his children's education.

The most successful anti-corruption efforts share three characteristics: they realign incentives, reduce discretionary power, and create self-enforcing mechanisms.

Radical simplification

The most effective anti-corruption measure for routine government services is radical simplification of rules and procedures. Georgia's post-Soviet reforms are instructive. In 2003, Georgia was one of the most corrupt post-Soviet states. By 2010, it had the lowest reported bribery rate in Europe and Central Asia³.

How? They didn't just tweak the system—they rebuilt it entirely. The new government fired the entire traffic police force—all 16,000 officers—in a single day. They simplified the tax code from 22 different taxes to just 6. Business licenses were reduced by 85%.

The lesson is clear: complex systems with numerous decision points create opportunities for corruption. Each form that needs approval, each inspection that requires certification, each permit with subjective criteria—these are all potential extraction points. Simplification works because it reduces the number of opportunities for corruption.

Hong Kong provides another compelling example. In the 1970s, it transformed from one of Asia's most corrupt territories to one of its cleanest. A key reform was the introduction of a "one-stop shop" for business regulations, reducing the previously labyrinthine approval process to a single point of contact, dramatically reducing opportunities for bribe extraction⁷.

Technology as commitment device

Digital systems can serve as commitment devices that make corruption more difficult. When Estonia moved government services online, it didn't just improve efficiency—it dramatically reduced corruption by eliminating most direct interactions between citizens and officials⁴. Estonia's X-Road system connects different services and databases, creating a transparent ecosystem where transactions leave digital footprints that can be audited⁸.

But technology alone isn't enough. India's biometric identification system, Aadhaar, was supposed to reduce corruption in welfare distribution. Results have been mixed because the system was layered onto existing bureaucracy rather than replacing it. Where digital systems work best is when they fundamentally change processes, not just digitize existing ones.

Chile's ChileCompra e-procurement platform offers an impressive success story. By moving government procurement online with standardized procedures and public visibility, Chile reduced corruption in public contracting by an estimated 20%⁹. The system works because it standardizes decisions that were previously discretionary and creates real-time public oversight of procurement decisions.

The key insight: effective technologies don't just automate processes—they reshape power relationships by removing discretion from officials and creating immutable audit trails.

Economic realignment

Perhaps the most fundamental approach is economic realignment. Singapore—once rampant with corruption—now has one of the cleanest governments globally. A key factor? Civil servants are among the highest-paid in the world⁵. When I visited Singapore's Civil Service College, an instructor told me bluntly: "We pay them too much to make bribery worthwhile."

This approach recognizes a simple truth: underpaid officials will find ways to supplement their income. By paying market-competitive salaries, Singapore changed the risk calculation. A bribe would need to be substantial enough to justify risking a well-paid, prestigious position.

The counterargument is cost—most developing countries can't afford Singapore-level salaries. But this misses the point. The economic cost of corruption typically exceeds proper compensation many times over. One study estimated that corruption costs the average developing country 1.5-2% of GDP annually⁶—far more than appropriate civil service salaries would require.

Botswana demonstrates this principle at work in a developing country context. Following independence, they implemented a policy of paying civil servants competitive salaries relative to the private sector. Combined with other reforms, this approach helped Botswana maintain one of the lowest corruption rates in Africa despite the "resource curse" that often accompanies diamond wealth¹⁰.

Collective action frameworks

A newer approach focuses on corruption as a collective action problem. Rather than emphasizing individual morality or institutional design, these approaches create frameworks where multiple stakeholders mutually monitor and enforce anti-corruption norms.

The Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST) exemplifies this approach. In countries like Honduras, CoST brings together government agencies, civil society organizations, and private companies to create mutual oversight of public infrastructure projects. The program has recovered millions in misspent funds and significantly improved project outcomes¹¹.

What makes collective action approaches powerful is that they don't rely on a single actor (like a government anti-corruption agency) that can itself become corrupted. Instead, they create systems where multiple stakeholders with different interests check each other.

Strategic sequencing

Recent research suggests that the sequencing of anti-corruption reforms matters enormously. Successful reformers typically start with high-impact, visible wins to build momentum before tackling more entrenched problems.

Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) illustrates this principle. Rather than attempting wholesale reform of Indonesia's deeply corrupt system, the KPK initially focused on high-profile "big fish" cases that built public confidence. With credibility established, they gradually expanded their focus to more systemic issues¹². This sequencing was crucial—starting with systemic reforms might have failed without the public support generated by visible early wins.

Behavioral nudges

Behavioral economics offers insights into fighting petty corruption through subtle "nudges" that alter decision contexts without changing fundamental incentives.

In a fascinating experiment in Mumbai, researchers found that simply requiring traffic police to submit citation receipts in sequential rather than arbitrary order reduced their opportunity to pocket fine money, increasing official revenues by over 400%¹³. The intervention didn't increase punishment or change compensation—it simply made misappropriation easier to detect.

Similar approaches have proven effective across contexts. In Uganda, publishing the amounts of school grants in local newspapers reduced funds misappropriated by officials by an estimated 75%¹⁴. The intervention didn't create new rules or incentives—it just made existing misappropriation more visible.

Morocco's Anti-Corruption Journey

Morocco presents an instructive case study in both the challenges and potential of anti-corruption reform in contexts where political will is variable and institutions are evolving.

Following the Arab Spring protests in 2011, Morocco adopted a new constitution containing strong anti-corruption provisions and established the National Authority for Probity, Prevention and Fighting Corruption (INPPLC). Unlike previous paper-tiger agencies, the INPPLC was granted constitutional independence and investigative powers¹⁵.

Yet implementation has been uneven. The legal framework evolved faster than institutional capacity, creating a gap between formal rules and enforcement capabilities. The INPPLC wasn't fully operational until 2018, seven years after its constitutional establishment.

Morocco's most successful anti-corruption initiatives have leveraged technology to reduce discretion. The 2011 launch of the WATIQA online platform for obtaining official documents eliminated numerous corruption opportunities by removing direct citizen-official interactions¹⁶. Previously, obtaining something as simple as a birth certificate could require bribes; today, these documents can be requested and received online.

Similarly, Morocco's e-procurement system (launched in 2007 and expanded in 2015) created standardized procedures for government contracting, reducing favoritism and bid-rigging¹⁷. A World Bank assessment found that the system cut processing times by 40% and significantly increased small business participation in government contracts by reducing the importance of informal connections.

Yet Morocco's experience highlights the limitations of technological approaches when not accompanied by broader reforms. Despite these advances, Morocco's Corruption Perceptions Index score improved only modestly, from 37 in 2012 to 41 in 2021¹⁸.

The missing piece appears to be political will for enforcement. While Morocco has created impressive legal and technical infrastructure for fighting corruption, the selective application of these tools has limited their impact. High-level corruption cases remain relatively rare, despite widespread public perception of corruption in upper echelons of business and government.

Morocco's most promising recent development is the growth of civil society anti-corruption efforts. Organizations like Transparency Morocco have become increasingly effective at documenting corruption and advocating for reform¹⁹. Their 2017 report on land expropriation corruption led to significant procedural reforms in how the government acquires private land for public projects.

Morocco illustrates a critical insight: anti-corruption tools are necessary but insufficient without consistent application. The country has demonstrated that technological reforms can reduce administrative corruption, but addressing higher-level corruption requires political will that has been more variable.

Microfoundations of reform

These approaches work because they address what I call the "microfoundations of corruption"—the actual decision processes individuals use when participating in corrupt systems.

Most corruption isn't cartoonishly evil people twirling mustaches. It's ordinary individuals making calculations about risk, reward, and necessity. The mother paying a bribe to get her child into school isn't endorsing corruption—she's trying to secure her child's future. The underpaid teacher accepting small gifts isn't trying to undermine institutions—he's trying to make rent.

Yet our anti-corruption rhetoric often treats corruption as purely moral failure rather than rational response to incentives. This moral framing feels satisfying but produces ineffective policy.

Cultural reset mechanisms

Some of the most dramatic corruption reductions have come through what might be called "cultural reset mechanisms"—interventions that rapidly shift expectations about what constitutes normal behavior.

When Rwanda rebuilt its police force after the genocide, it implemented a radical approach to shifting police culture. New recruits underwent intensive ethical training, but more importantly, their early interactions were carefully engineered to prevent corruption norms from establishing. Officers were frequently rotated between assignments, preventing the formation of corrupt networks. Pay was low but reliable, housing was provided, and performance was measured partly by corruption complaints²⁰.

The result was remarkable—Rwanda's police transformed from one of Africa's most corrupt forces to one of its least corrupt in less than a decade. The key insight was that culture forms quickly in new organizations; by carefully designing early experiences and expectations, reformers established anti-corruption as the default norm.

Targeted formalization

Formalization—bringing informal economic activity into the regulated economy—is often prescribed as an anti-corruption measure. But blanket formalization can backfire if formal systems are themselves corrupt or inefficient.

Peru's targeted formalization approach offers lessons. Rather than attempting to formalize the entire informal economy (roughly 70% of Peru's workforce), reformers focused on specific high-value sectors where formalization could deliver immediate benefits. Property registration was simplified through the "Praedial" program, reducing a 7-year, 207-step process to a 45-day, 4-step procedure²¹.

This approach reduced bribes paid for property transactions by an estimated 75%. By targeting a specific pain point rather than pursuing universal formalization, Peru achieved meaningful corruption reduction in a critical area while acknowledging that broader formalization would need to await further institutional improvements.

Escaping local maxima

The most successful cases share another characteristic: they involved discontinuous change rather than incremental reform. Georgia didn't gradually improve its police force—it fired everyone and started over. Estonia didn't slowly digitize government—it built an entirely new digital infrastructure.

This makes intuitive sense. Corrupt systems represent Nash equilibria—stable states where no individual actor benefits from unilateral change. Incremental reforms don't shift the equilibrium enough to create a new stable state. The system simply absorbs the change and reverts.

The implication is sobering: effective anti-corruption efforts likely require political windows where dramatic action is possible—typically crises or rare moments of overwhelming public consensus.

Transparency 2.0: Actionable transparency

Standard transparency measures often fail because they produce information that's comprehensive but not actionable. Citizens are overwhelmed with data they can't effectively process or act upon.

Ukraine's ProZorro procurement system represents an evolution in transparency thinking. Rather than simply publishing procurement data, ProZorro created an ecosystem where civil society organizations and competing businesses could easily monitor and challenge suspicious contracts²². The system was designed for actionability—civil society watchdogs receive structured data feeds they can analyze for suspicious patterns, while businesses can easily flag potentially corrupt tender specifications.

The results are impressive—in its first two years, ProZorro saved an estimated $1 billion in government funds. The key innovation wasn't transparency itself but the creation of an ecosystem where transparency information could be effectively acted upon by motivated stakeholders.

Diagonal accountability

Traditional accountability is either vertical (citizens holding officials accountable through elections) or horizontal (government agencies checking each other). A promising new approach is "diagonal accountability," where citizens participate directly in government oversight functions.

In the Philippines, Textbook Count engaged ordinary citizens in monitoring textbook delivery to schools. Previously, up to 40% of textbooks were lost to corruption. With citizen monitors tracking deliveries and verifying receipts, textbook losses fell to under 5%²³.

Similar approaches have proven effective across contexts. Mexico's social witness program embeds civil society representatives directly in procurement processes for major government contracts²⁴. Unlike traditional transparency where citizens are passive consumers of information, diagonal accountability makes citizens active participants in oversight.

Toward better approaches

If we take these lessons seriously, what would better anti-corruption efforts look like?

First, they would focus less on catching "bad apples" and more on redesigning systems to minimize discretion and align incentives. The goal isn't better enforcement of complex rules but fewer, clearer rules that require less enforcement.

Second, they would embrace digitization not just for efficiency but as governance infrastructure that fundamentally alters power relationships. The most promising applications aren't just online forms but blockchain-like systems that create immutable records of transactions and decisions.

Third, they would recognize that sustainable reform requires economic viability. Officials need legal paths to reasonable prosperity, or corruption will inevitably reemerge.

Fourth, they would prepare for and capitalize on moments when discontinuous change becomes possible, rather than assuming steady incremental progress.

Fifth, they would prioritize collective action frameworks over reforms that rely on single incorruptible actors. Anti-corruption institutions themselves are vulnerable to corruption; systems where multiple stakeholders check each other have proven more resilient.

Sixth, they would harness behavioral insights to change the decision environment rather than relying on changing individual motivations. Small changes in procedures can sometimes yield outsized reductions in corruption by making malfeasance more visible or more difficult.

None of this is easy. But we've spent decades trying approaches that feel morally satisfying but don't work. Perhaps it's time to try approaches that might seem less viscerally appealing—less focused on catching and punishing wrongdoers—but have better chances of actually reducing corruption.

The choice isn't between moral condemnation and accepting corruption. It's between ineffective moral posturing and actually creating systems where corruption becomes unnecessary and irrational. The least moral approach is continuing to implement policies we know don't work, while expecting different results.